

A
 L E T T E R
 To the Rev. Mr. DEAN, of *Middleton*;
 Occasioned by reading his ESSAY
 ON THE
 FUTURE LIFE
 OF
 BRUTE CREATURES.

H
 By J. ROTHWELL, Master of the Free
 Grammar School of *Blackrod, Lancashire*.

Vox Populi, Vox Dei.

ADAG.

*What is there so very ridiculous in supposing every thing
 made for man, when he is the only created being, who knows
 how to consider the relation, in which all things stand to himself?*

ROUSSEAU

Printed in the Year M,DCC,LXIX.

2009

L E T T E R

To the Hon. Mr. D. of M...

of the ...



BROOKLYN

By ... of the ...

A

LETTER, &c.

Reverend Sir,

YOUR Essay on the future life of Brute Creatures fell into my hands by mere chance. If it was advertised, I was not apprized of it: otherwise the Novelty of the Title would so far have excited my curiosity, as to have raised in me, at least, a desire of getting a sight of it.

I had not gone thro' many pages in the introductory part, before I began to conceive not the most favourable opinion of the whole performance: concluding from the specimen I had already seen, that you would hardly be able to demonstrate your point, to the satisfaction of your readers. For, is it likely that a truth which hath escaped the

deep piercing eye, and elaborate researches of a Newton, a Locke, and a Boyle, and of all the literati of the present enlightened and inquisitive age, should now at length be demonstrated by a person, an entire stranger in the republic of letters? Is it even possible, (without some supernatural aid) that he who seems to be possessed of no extraordinary talents, neither in learning nor penetration, should ascertain that, which hath hitherto been veiled in impenetrable darkness, and kept a secret from the foundation of the world? *a* Thus did I reason with myself, nor could I find, after perusing the whole essay, that I had the least occasion to recede from the judgment I had at the first, formed of it.

Numbers of your good friends and subscribers are sorry to find, that you have so unhappily misemployed your time and your talents upon a subject, which is not likely

(*a*) I observe you quote passages both out of Jewish and Christian writers, to prove that yours is not a novel doctrine; but these will be animadverted upon in their proper places.

either

either to redound to your credit and character, either as an author or a clergyman. Nay, several of your reverend brethren, to my certain knowledge, are not only aggrieved at it, but very able too, (did they think it worth their while) with ease to point out and expose the sophistry and futility of your arguments.

But as none of them, (at least that I know of) have thought proper to do it; and as the system you have been labouring to establish, appears to me not only to be built upon a false foundation, but likewise to be rather subversive of, than subservient to, the cause of virtue and religion, my inclination strongly prompted me to set about writing an answer myself; sensible as I was at the same time of my own inabilities and insufficiency for such an undertaking. The little learning I lay claim to, tends to a different point, than that of investigating and diving into the hidden things of futurity, farther than as they are plainly revealed in holy writ.

It

It is an observation grounded upon fact, that there never was an opinion broached, however absurd or pernicious it might be in its consequences, but it met with numbers of credulous and ill judging people, ready to embrace it with an implicit faith, and eagerly strenuous to espouse its cause. How extremely cautious then should every one be, who intends to publish his sentiments to the world, especially upon subjects of a religious nature, and subjects too that carry an air of novelty in them? He ought not only strictly to examine and weigh them well himself, but to submit them likewise to the free animadversion of some honest and judicious friend, before he presume to lay them before the eye of the public. For if, as some suppose, the mischievous consequences, that follow from a person's writing, or from his setting a bad example, will hereafter recoil with tenfold force upon his own head, what a black bill of indictment will, at the last grand audit, be preferred against all those, who have wilfully prostituted their tongue or their pen, and pro-

fessedly

feffedly avowed the cause of infidelity and profaneness. (b)

I am far from laying any thing of this sort to your charge. However it is much, if your essay will be the happy means of preventing the one, or of discountenancing the other.

(b) I remember reading a story somewhere of a noted atheist, in Queen Ann's reign, who by corrupting the principles of several of our young nobility and gentry, had done a deal of mischief. But so greatly was he careffed, and so liberally rewarded by them, that in a little time he kept his coach and suitable equipage. But all his popularity and grandeur could not keep off the unwelcome intrusion of sickness; nor all his artful shifts and evasions elude the inexorable and merciless hand of death. For in process of time, it happened that he was seized with a violent disorder, which threatened to put a speedy period to his existence here. When behold, on a sudden, he threw off the mask, and ingenuously confessed, that even he himself was never thoroughly convinced of that which he had taken such indefatigable pains to persuade others into the belief of, namely, that there was neither God nor future state. Inwardly stung with remorse, and apprehensive of being shortly called to a strict and severe account for his past offences, he was desirous (a case by no means uncommon) to compromise matters, and be reconciled, if it were possible, to his justly offended God. In order to ef-

I need

I need not tell you, how very ready the choice spirits (as they are pleased to call themselves) and freethinkers of the age are to catch at any thing that suits their vitiated taste, and more so, if it comes from a clergyman. And will not your essay, think you, afford them a most delicious repast? How will they chuckle and hug it? How will they nibble, and carve, and mince, and mangle it, and avail themselves of every part that makes for their purpose?

fect this, he sends for an eminent clergyman of the established church, and lays before him his seemingly irremediable and deplorable case, together with all its aggravating circumstances. The good divine, after hearing his melancholy story, endeavours to dispel his doubts and dissipate his fears, and tells him there was still mercy in store for him, provided he was a real and sincere penitent.--Ah! says he, casting up his rueful eyes to heaven, I wish there was: but I forgot to mention to you one particular farther, which I greatly fear is beyond all your skill and dexterity to get over. You are to know (and oh! that I had never done it) I have written several books in defence of atheism; now as these are dispersed and got into a great number of hands, it is impossible ever to call them in again. So that what I am under the most uneasy apprehensions about, is the mischief they will do in the world when I am gone. Oh! says the honest and goodnatured divine,

Let

Let us for once suppose, (and there is no impropriety in the supposition) I say, let us fancy one of them, after reading your essay, expostulating the case thus with himself.---

“ I was persuaded before, or at least endeavoured to persuade myself, into the disbelief of a future state. But now I have got new and more cogent reasons than ever, to rivet me in my opinion. I did to be sure here-

never let that give you the least uneasiness. The books you mention I have read myself; but your cause was so very bad, and the arguments you have advanced are so silly, and little to the purpose, that I am persuaded no man of sense will ever be the worse for them.—These words stung the poor wretch to the quick, and he was so chagrined to hear his abilities as a writer disputed or called in question, that he could contain no longer, but in a fit of sullen rage and despair, he threw himself on the opposite side of the bed, and cried out, I'll live and die an atheist. He expired soon after, and went unto his own place.—A warning this to all those, who in the gaiety of heart, or to display their refined taste and talents, are but too apt to vent newfangled and sceptical notions about religion.

Poor Voltaire ! poor Bolingbroke ! poor or rather wretched are all ye of a deistical turn of mind, whose super-refined and high exalted taste disdains to stoop to the humble doctrines of the gospel.—Happy, thrice and more

B

tofore

tofore find but too much reason to conclude that the christian religion, as well as all the other religions, with which the world is pestered, is a mere farce, a piece of sly priestcraft and state policy, merely calculated to keep the ignorant vulgar in awe; but now I am fully convinced of it. How else is it

happy ye mortals, who, without any other distinguishing good qualities, have yet the good sense, prudence and wisdom, to embrace and ever hold fast the lively oracles of truth and eternal salvation, notwithstanding there may be some inexplicable difficulties and seeming incongruities in them, which for ought we know to the contrary, might be purposely intended to try our faith, our constancy and perseverance.

Wherefore did Sterne, and Churchill, (great as they certainly were) sully and defile their works with any thing of an immoral tendency? Could they not possibly have been as eminent, would not the sober and well grounded reflection of having done good in their generation, have filled their self-approving hearts with as much real complacency and delectation, had they undertook the worthy, but too much neglected cause of virtue and religion? Their names, perhaps, as it is, will be handed down to posterity, thro' the medium of their very masterly writings; but not with that ever blooming lustre, that sweet smelling fragrance, which never fails to attend upon those, who have valiently and successfully combated with the abandoned partisans of vice and irreligion.

possible

possible that he who pretends to be a teacher and an expounder of its doctrines, should fall into the most egregious blunders and palpable absurdities, in his notions about the existence and nature of a future state? For, sooner would I believe that a Prometheus could animate a lump of clay, and confer upon it the faculties of reason and speech, than any one shall ever persuade me, that all the brute creation, from the largest elephant to the most diminutive mite; that all the beasts, birds, reptiles, insects, animalcules and those infinite shoals of living creatures that lie hid in the bosom of the deep, must be reanimated and enjoy a state of endless duration and felicity. What! shall all those animals, whose lives at their longest extent here, are, some of them, only of a few days, others of a few hours duration, (c) live again to eternity? Shall the oyster, for instance, which to human appearance partakes of privileges little superior to inani-

(c) The ephemeron lives but part of a day, being produced about six in the evening, and dying about eleven; but during its short existence, it is light and agile, and spends its time in frisking over the waters.

mate matter, be cloathed again with immortality? No, no; never pretend to go upon the principles of right reason, and talk so inconsistently with her dictates."

Again, the wretch, whose abject and penurious circumstance, tie him down to continual hardships and drudgery, may be supposed, upon hearing your reasoning and argumentation, repiningly to break out into the following bitter exclamation. "Wretched man that I am! would to God I had never been born! I am taught to believe that my everlasting welfare or woe depends upon my behaviour here. But I meet with so many obstacles in my way, in order to attain the one and avoid the other; so many temptations from without and evil propensities from within, and all these aggravated with the cares of this world, to supply my urgent and ever-craving necessities, that I have little, either leisure or inclination, to secure the one thing needful. Better, ten thousand times better were it for me to have been a beast, a log, or any thing, than the two-legged animal I am. The sufferings

sufferings of beasts, at the most, are but transitory and inconsiderable ; and at the last, by some sudden stroke or a few moments of pain, they die, and, according to this system, are sure to be eternally happy. Whereas I, who, in other respects, have incontestibly greatly the advantage over them, am not only doomed to be miserable here, but run extreme hazard of being so hereafter. If this be not making God into a partial and unmerciful being, pray, tell me what is, and yet, his ways are said to be, and most assuredly are, just, and good, and true."

Thus may we imagine the poor man to argue from your hypothesis. And indeed, whoever will be at the pains to examine into things impartially, will find that few, very few of the brute creation, in comparison of the whole, seem to suffer at all in this life, but are left entirely to themselves, to range at large, as nature prompts and directs them. And of those few, which do suffer hardships, how do we know but that, upon the whole, life is a blessing to them rather than the contrary? To

To reason from analogy. Are not the good and evil things of this life, think you, portioned out to mankind, pretty nearly in an equal manner? The rich man, for instance, has plenty of every thing his heart can wish for: but then, he hath a thousand temptations and difficulties to encounter and grapple with. He may (which is but too frequently the case) by indulging and continually gratifying his vitiated appetite, make a shipwreck of that inestimable jewel, his health. His very pleasures, (and the most refined, the soonest) by a continued round of dissipation and want of thought, become very often stale and insipid, if not a fatal snare to him. For, as Solomon observes, riches are sometimes left for the owners thereof to their own hurt. On the contrary, the poor man is necessitated to hard labour, to watching and fasting. But notwithstanding this, he may not be, nay he is not, without his comforts and enjoyments. His sleep is generally sweet, sound, and unbroken; and he sits down to his coarse and homely meal with a thankful heart and unpalled appetite: and his

his short but refreshing relaxations from toil, may yield him ten times more real and exquisite delight, than any thing the great man, with all his pageanty and plenty, can boast of (*d*).

And are we sure that this is not pretty much the case with brute creatures? may not those that suffer hardships and hunger, during their intervals of rest and refreshment, enjoy that rest with double relish, and with avidity eat the very leavings of those that are pampered with dainties, and enervated with idleness and ease? if this be the real case with brutes (and where is the man that can disprove it?) I would fain know for what reason they are to be rewarded with the happiness of a future life. Not, I presume, for any desert of their own. But a reward always presupposes some kind of merit in the

(*d*) This, at the first glance, may seem to clash with what was said a little before. But it is to be considered, that in the former instance, the poor man is supposed to repine and murmur at his hard condition; here he is represented as quite easy and contented with his humble lot, and making the best of it he can.

object

object to be rewarded. Can brutes plead any such? will omnipotence allot a reward for well doing to a being incapable of doing ill? can brutes possibly deviate from the line of life chalked out to them? if they cannot, by what precedent or plea can they lay claim to a reward (*e*): and herein lies the difference between man and brutes, as to a future state. It is man's being placed, in a state of probation here, and endowed with reason, free-will, and a capacity of doing good or evil, that renders him a fit object to receive future rewards and punishments, consequential upon the rectitude or depravity of his behaviour.

Some perhaps may think, that enough hath been already said, to satisfy any reasonable and unprejudiced person, with regard to the point in question. But as all men do not view the same object in the

(*e*) For my own part, could I once be persuaded to believe that brutes must be restored to life again in a future state, I should imagine that horses (particularly common hackney and post chaise horses) are by much the greatest sufferers, a sudden and strange metamorphosis would at
same

same point of light; so what may appear convincing to one, may not have the same powerful influence upon another. I shall therefore immediately proceed to take a review of the essay itself. With regard to the introduction, which takes up all the first volume, as it has no immediate relation to the point in question, I shall only animadvert upon some particular passages. Your propositions in the second volume will have a distinct and particular examination bestowed upon them.

You begin your first volume with an enquiry into the nature and origin of evil (*f*);

that solemn time take place, and the once sorely-galled horses commence riders, and ride the men-brutes, who treated them in so barbarous a manner in this life, at the savage rate of *Quadrupedante putrem*, &c. backwards and forwards over *Salmones*'s brazen bridge in the infernal regions, 'till they have taken ten thousand fold vengeance, *secundum jus talionis*; and that then the former will be conducted to the blissful regions of *Elysium*, and the latter kicked down into the frightful abyss of annihilation.

(*f*) If Mr. Dean has not forgot, I cannot but look upon the ninth article of our religion as a sufficient proof of the cause of all the evils incident to human beings, with-

a subject, you tell us, that has exercised the wit and pens of a great many writers before you. One would be apt to conclude from this concession, that unless you could have advanced something new upon the subject, or set matters in a different and clearer light, there was no great necessity to obtrude upon the public another treatise upon it; especially as it bears but a very remote (if any) connexion with what you professedly treat upon. We will allow, indeed, that unless you had luckily hit upon some such expedient as this, your book would not have appeared in that bulky and voluminous size it doth. But this by-the-bye (g).

out any sophistical investigations, which at last only leave the mind in suspense and doubt, whether to take the road of true religion, or that of atheism.

(g) You will excuse my freedom, but I cannot help thinking your case to be somewhat parallel to that of the comic poets in Horace's time, who, provided he could but finger the cash, was under no manner of concern, what kind of reception his plays met with from the public.

*Gessit enim nummum in loculos demittere post hoc
Securus cadat, an recto stet fabula talo.*

You

You inform us, page 8, that the species of evil you propose to consider, is that which is commonly stiled physical or natural and that by natural evils are meant those sufferings of creatures, to which we usually give the names of pain, sickness, infirmity, want, disease and death. And the reason why we call them natural, is because all living creatures are by their very natures, inevitably and universally subject to them.

Page 11. you beg leave to take a slight survey of the condition of beings, subject to the strokes of natural evil. And without exaggerating matters, the story may be made affecting and melancholy enough. For tho' it cannot truly and properly be said, that we are every moment in the throng of misery and the circle of unhappiness, and that one glance of the sad scene is sufficient to agitate the whole frame of the soul; nor yet that our doors are every day crouded with objects fainting under the pangs of hunger and thirst (*b*): however this much we may safely

(*b*) These are Mr. Dean's words—words, in my humble opinion, much unbecoming the dignity of his cloth,

venture to affirm, that we can hardly read a news-paper, or look out at a window, but we are presented with scenes of distress, that cannot fail to excite our compassion, and that challenge our friendly and charitable assistance.

Many of the evils, to which we are subject, do, as you observe, issue from unsuspected sources and invifible causes; and some, tho' foreseen, cannot be prevented or avoided. The force of imagination too helps mightily to encrease the load, and makes that which was at first merely ideal, become a real mischief in the end. Again, how frequently have we occasion to sympathize with others in their sorrows? yet even this, tho' a commendable passion, cannot be indulged without some degree of evil. And lastly, the mind is extremely dexterous at magnifying its own miseries. We count every tedious moment of pain, imagine e-

inasmuch as they represent the Almighty, as delighting more to create unhappy men than happy, and also rob him of those amiable attributes of love, benevolence and mercy, which are so eminently conspicuous in all his works.

very

very minute of it an hour, and every hour a day.

But maugre all this multiplicity and complication of evils, that surround us, we have still an asylum to fly to, and that is the sure and certain hope of a future and a better world, from which all pain and grief will be utterly excluded. In this world however afflictions have their use, nay to some men, are very necessary. Tho' they may be ungrateful to the tender sensations of humanity, yet being the wise dispensations of an omniscient God, they ought to be borne with that resignation, which future hopes dictate, and not the misery increased by unjust comparisons with the present ease of some brutes.

Page 34, you proceed to lay before us the four different opinions concerning the origin of physical or natural evil.

The first opinion is that of the Manichees, who maintained this principle, that from the beginning there were two first causes

causes that governed the world, the one good, the other bad.

To shew the absurdity of this opinion, we need only remark, that the notion of two supreme, independent beings, involving a contradiction, cannot be true. For each of them being equal and infinite, and yet every where opposite the one to the other, they must of course fall foul upon, and destroy each other. See Grotius de verit. rel. Christ l. 1. f. 9. As to what Bayle talks, of matters being compromised and adjusted between them, 'tis all impertinent rant and empty jargon.

The second opinion concerning the origin of natural evil, is that of the schoolmen, adopted by Leibnitz. This notion supposes evil necessary to perfect the divine plan of creation, or that a world consisting of good and evil, is better than a world, where there is nothing but pure good and unmixed happiness.

There

There are few, I presume, but will assent to this proposition, viz. Whatever is, is for the best. But there is a mixture of good and evil in the world. Therefore such a mixture is for the best. Further, God is said to be the creator or efficient cause of all things that do exist. But can an all-wise, good and perfect being, be the author of evil? God forbid. Yet we see evil doth exist. How then is its existence to be accounted for? perhaps it may be made out this way. Tho' the creator of the universe cannot, without derogating from his goodness and his other infinite perfections, be said to create evil; yet he may be said to suffer it, and permit it to overspread the world (i) The very notion of free-will, and free-agency, presupposes that man may think and do that which is evil.

But some perhaps will ask, why doth the Almighty, whose gracious loving kindness and tender mercies extend over all his works,

(i) *Deus hominem creavit cum agendi libertate, quæ agendi libertas vitiosa non est, sed potest suâ vi aliquid vitiosum producere.*

Grotius.
permit

permit evil to ravage and carry desolation so unrestrainedly and universally? undoubtedly for the ultimate good and recovery of fallen man, some evils being medicinal (*k*) such as remorse of conscience, and the natural calamitous effects of vice. Nay there is no one seeming evil, however trivial and minute, but what was designed in the end to terminate in good. Thus resentment, the repeller of injuries and self-defender, may swell into revenge; and emulation may degenerate into envy or destructive ambition; however the source was good. In short, had man continued upright, evil had been a nonentity. It was man's apostacy that brought death and all the hideous train of evils into the world.

Let us hear Rousseau's sentiments in respect to evil "If man" says he, "be an active and free being, he acts of himself; none of his spontaneous actions therefore

(*k*) *Put a ad emendationem hominis, aut etiam in pœnam delicto respondentem. Imo sæpe hæc ab ipsa bonitate proficiuntur, sicut a bono medico ingratum saponi pharmacum.*

Id.

enter

enter into the general system of providence, nor can be imputed to it. Providence doth not contrive the evil, which is the consequence of man's abusing the liberty his creator gave him; it only doth not prevent it, either because the evil, which so impotent a being is capable of doing, is beneath its notice, or because it cannot prevent it without laying a restraint upon his liberty, and causing a greater evil by debasing his nature. Providence hath left man at liberty, not that he should do evil but good, by choice. It hath capacitated him to make such choice, in making use of the faculties it hath bestowed upon him: his powers however, at the same time, are so limited and confined, that the abuse he makes of his liberty, is not of importance enough to disturb the general order of the universe. The evil done by man falls upon his own head, without making any change in the system of the world, without hindering the human species from being preserved in spite of themselves. To complain therefore that God doth not prevent man from doing evil, is in fact to complain, that he hath given a superior excel-

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lence

lence to human nature, that he hath ennobled our actions by annexing to them the merit of virtue. The highest enjoyment is that of being contented with ourselves; it is in order to deserve this contentment, that we are placed here on earth, and endowed with liberty, that we are tempted by our passions and restrained by conscience. Could it have established a contradiction in our nature, or have allotted a reward for well-doing to a being incapable of doing ill? Is it necessary, in order to prevent man from being wicked, to reduce all his faculties to a simple instinct, and make him a mere brute? No, never can I reproach the deity for having given me a soul, made in his own image, that I might be free, good and happy like himself. It is the abuse of our faculties, which makes us wicked and miserable. Our cares, our anxieties, our griefs, are all owing to ourselves. Moral evil is incontestably our own work, and physical evil would in fact be nothing, did not our vices render us sensible of it.

“ Enquire

“ Enquire then no longer, man, who is the author of evil : behold him in yourself. There exists no other evil in nature, than what you either do or suffer, and you are equally the author of both. Take away our fatal improvements, take away our errors and our vices ; take away, in short, every thing that is the work of man, and all the rest is good.”

The method which God pursues in every thing he does, is certainly the best. But Leibnitz loses himself, when he asserts that the world is more excellent on account of evils. Not but that, as things are constituted, natural evils have their use, discipline being oftentimes the happy means of bringing men to a serious reflection, which, if it hath its due effect, will be succeeded by a thorough reformation and amendment of life. There are likewise other benefits accruing from it. If there was no such thing as pain and sickness, we should soon grow surfeited, as it were, with health and ease. How often, after enjoying a long succession of serene sunshiny days, have we wished for

chilling winds, and gloomy, boisterous weather? But for poverty, where would be the great use and advantage of riches? And were it not for necessity, there would be few and slow improvements in the liberal arts and sciences; necessity being the mother of invention.

You tell us, page 40. you cannot help thinking it an absurdity to say that human actions are foreseen. We will allow that there are difficulties attending the notion of God's prescience or foreknowledge, and how to reconcile it to man's freedom. But the same objection lies equally against many other things we believe in, which we short-sighted creatures cannot account for. And yet we cannot disbelieve them, as the contrary notion is embarrassed with more and greater difficulties. If we will admit nothing but what we are able to explain, we must renounce all religion, and have recourse to atheism, which is itself beset with the most insuperable difficulties. What is more certain, yet harder to form a distinct notion of, than absolute eternity? The immensity

mensity of the supreme being, his infinite wisdom and goodness in the frame of the universe, are very evident; yet there are many things belonging to them, the design of which does, and always will, remain a mystery to us. Again, human liberty and free-agency, we are very conscious of, but, if we consider them metaphysically, we shall find ourselves drawn into inextricable mazes and perplexities. The same may be said of the notion of spiritual and material substances, and the infinite divisibility of the latter. But it is a principle admitted in philosophy, that when a thing is once proved by proper evidences and arguments sufficient in their kind, we are not to reject it merely because it is attended with embarrassments and difficulties, which we cannot unravel or surmount.

“ It seems to me,” says Mr. Wollaston, “ not impossible that God should know what is to come. On the contrary, it is highly probable that he does and must know things future. He upon whom the being and nature of every thing depends, and
who

who therefore must ultimately know all their powers, and what effects they will have, can easily see thro' the train of causes and effects, and whatever will come to pass in that way."

Observe what a sagacity there is in some men not only in respect to physical causes and effects, but also in respect to the future actings of mankind, and how very easy it is, many times, if the persons concerned, their characters and circumstances are given, to foresee what they will do : as also to foretel many general events, though the intermediate transactions, upon which they depend, are not known. Consider how much more remarkable this penetration is in some men than in others. Consider further, that if there be any minds more perfect than the human, (and who can be so conceited of himself as to question this ?) they must still have it in a more eminent degree, proportionably to the excellence of their natures. In the last place, do but allow (as you must) this power of discerning to be in God according to the perfection of his nature, as in lower beings it is in proportion
to

to theirs, and then it becomes infinite. And then again, the future actions of free agents are at once all unlocked and exposed to his view. For that knowledge is not infinite, which is limited to things past or present, or which come to pass necessarily. Lastly, as ignorance is an imperfection, and as all imperfections are to be denied of the deity, he must consequently know all things.

P. 41, you thus go on. The divine being has infinite resources in his own power, can instantly apply to the most contingent and least probable events the very moment they exist, and by an address peculiar to himself, can so dispose and turn them, as it suiteth best with his godly wisdom, and the great ends he proposes ultimately to bring to pass. So that tho' he does not foresee the actions of intelligent beings, as infallibly future, yet the schemes he has formed, and the designs he has meditated in his own wisdom and goodness, are conducted with as much order and propriety, as if he had predetermined every phenomenon in nature. We look upon this, you say, as a proceeding

ing far more worthy of providence, than that which pins down the poor creature to some particular and determinate way of acting, more consistent with the divine perfections, and more agreeable to the state of intelligent natures, who are believed to be accountable for all they do.

In answer to this, I do not see that the divine prescience takes away man's free-agency. The nature of an action is not changed by being known beforehand. God's foreseeing how we shall act, is not the reason that we shall act so and so : but because we shall act in such and such a manner, therefore he foresees it. " For," as Rousseau observes, " future, or what to us is future, may be truly the object of divine knowledge, as present is of ours ; nor can we tell what respect past, present, to come, have to the divine mind, nor wherein they differ. Our limited comprehension is incapable of conceiving any thing that is unlimited. Whatever we call infinite, is beyond our conception. What can we deny or affirm, what arguments can we employ on a
subject

subject we cannot conceive? Man is intelligent by the act of reasoning, but the supreme intelligence lies under no necessity to reason. He requires neither premises nor consequences, nor even the simple form of a proposition; he beholds equally what is and will be; all truths are to him as one idea, as all places are but one point, and all times one moment."

The prescience of God is so boundless and uncircumscribed, and so infinitely exceeding the utmost stretch of our most exalted thoughts, that all that can be safely said of it is, that this knowledge is most perfect and exquisite, being intimately acquainted with the natures, powers and properties of every thing it doth fore-know. Whence it doth follow, that if there be any creature free and unrestrained, and that under such circumstances and at such a time, he may act or not act in any particular manner: this perfect fore-knowledge must discern from all eternity, that the said creature may, in such circumstances, act thus or not.

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In short, as God's omnipotence does only extend so far as to be able to do whatever implies no contradiction ; so his prescience can extend no farther than to know whatever implies no contradiction to be known. Now free and contingent actions or effects do either imply a contradiction to be fore-known, or they do not. If the former be the case, they are no object of his prescience ; and therefore there can be no pretence that his fore-knowledge doth determine them. But if they imply no contradiction to be fore-known, as they certainly do not, this is to acknowledge that divine prescience, and they may very well consist together. And so either way, notwithstanding the divine prescience, the actions of men may be free.

Though I am sensible that this argument hath been already extended to too great a length, yet such of my readers as have not yet seen the following remarks, which I lately met with in one of the magazines, will, I flatter myself, not blame me for superadding them to the foregoing.

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The question concerning the divine prescience, has been perplexed with metaphysical subtilties, and difficulties have been started that tend to introduce a sceptical uncertainty. But we should reflect, that the most simple objects of nature, may suggest difficulties utterly inexplicable by the human intellect, the truth and certainty of which objects are usually acknowledged. Therefore no abstracted point of speculation is to be rejected merely on account of the difficulties that may attend it. This I thought necessary to premise, that the reader may with the more candour review the following arguments.

It may be laid down as a theological axiom, that God is a being endued with all possible perfection; many of his attributes are inferred from their effects displayed in the constitution of the universe. Many, I say, for we infer not all of them; since some attributes are inherent in the divine being abstractedly, and have no visible connection with his works. Of this latter kind is the attribute of prescience, which con-

sists in the knowledge of future actions and events : this knowledge must certainly be mysterious to a creature whose ken is limited to the present moment ; but that can be no just reason for denying it. For the divine attributes excel the human faculties both in kind and degree. Ignorance of any thing possible to be known, implies a defect, since future actions are capable of being known ; that is, since the knowledge of them involves in it no contradiction in terms, we must conclude that they are the objects of the divine omniscience. Consequently the fall of Adam was fore-known at the creation.

To which it is replied, if God fore-knew the fall of Adam, whether it was possible for him to have prevented it? Here let it be considered, that the prescience of the deity respected only himself ; it had no necessary influence on the mind of Adam. There is an instance from analogy, that may serve to illustrate the point before us. Men of sagacity, who are well acquainted with the dispositions of particular persons, will form

a very probable judgment concerning the behaviour of those persons, under any circumstances that may happen to them ; their moral liberty still remaining inviolate, notwithstanding the previous judgment of their conduct. We may safely then argue *à minori ad majus* that the searcher of hearts, who had an intimate knowledge of all the powers and faculties in the mind of Adam, must know in what manner Adam would use those powers and faculties. There is an essential difference between the prescience of actions, and the prescience of events : the actions proceed from the free will of moral agents, uncontrouled by any necessary impulse : the events happen in a regular series, established immediately by the creator himself. They are equally fore-known, tho' in a different manner. In strictness of speech, there is nothing future in respect to the deity ; all things appear to him in one view. Future things are as certain to him, as present things are to us. Known to God are all his works from the beginning of the world. At the creation of the universe, an immense plan of government was formed
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by infinite wisdom, extended not only to this transitory stage of our existence, but to the boundless ages of eternity. This plan is not regulated by absolute fatality, but is perfectly consistent with free-agency, I mean, in respect to the actions of rational beings. The divine prescience has no more influence upon future actions, than our knowledge of things present has upon them. Realities are true in themselves, whether we know them or not ; so likewise future actions are fore-known to the divine intelligence, because they will happen ; they do not happen, because they are fore-known.

It may be asked, why did God give Adam powers and faculties, which he knew he would abuse to his own prejudice ? To which I answer, that there is a necessary imperfection in every creature, even the most exalted in the scale of existence from the nature of his being as a creature ; the absolute perfection of the creator being totally incommunicable. Either then there must have been no created being, or he must be imperfect, and consequently peccable

cable. This peccability is more or less, in proportion to the nature of the being. Superior orders of beings are less liable to deviation from their original rectitude than the inferior, since they approach nearer to the center of perfection. Adam was more prone to temptation on account of the inferiority of his rank. Let us suppose that God might have created Adam, and other beings incapable of sinning, by a coercive method ; his power, in such a case, would have clashed with his wisdom. His intelligent creatures would have been governed by the same compulsive principles which actuate the natural world, and the whole creation would have been only a mechanical system, all the springs of which would have moved by the same general law of necessity. On this supposition, there could not possibly have been the least merit in any creature. It is a general rule, in the moral government of God, to render rational beings fit subjects of rewards and punishments, by placing them in a state of probation, wherein they may discover a meritorious disposition or the contrary. Liberty
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is a sacred deposit ; happy they who use it to those noble purposes, which were intended by the author of their freedom. The fall of Adam must be considered as the effect of his own voluntary choice : he might have prevented it by duly exerting his powers in an humble obedience to the divine will. The deity fore-knew his fall, but did not cause it, and mercifully provided a remedy for fallen man, even the Lamb, slain from the foundation of the world.

I presume by this time, Mr. Dean, you are pretty well satisfied, if reason and argument will satisfy you, not only that human actions are fore-seen, but likewise, that, tho' God doth fore-see them, man is not, for all that, pinned down to one particular and determinate way of acting.

The third opinion relating to the origin of natural evil, is that of some moderns, which teaches that matter and evil are inseparable, or that where matter is concerned, there must be evil.

As matter is at present modified, that is, under its present laws, qualities and dispositions, it is perhaps not capable of perfection; and therefore where that is concerned, there must be imperfections, and consequently evils. But notwithstanding its present state, it does not therefore follow, that this always was, or always will be the case with matter. For at this rate evil was introduced into paradise before the fall, and Adam in his state of innocence was not exempted from it. Nay farther, if matter and evil are inseparable, sorrow and pain will be admitted into the regions of bliss and everlasting happiness. For after the righteous are received into glory, their bodies, tho' mightily changed, will still partake of the nature and essence of matter. So that the notion, that where matter is concerned there must be evil, is contrary to the express testimony of scripture.

The fourth and last opinion is, that natural evil is commensurate with, and was the consequence of the fall of Adam: which is the only true one, as it is consonant both

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with scripture and reason, and sets the divine goodness clear of all imputations, which cannot be said of the three forementioned opinions.

The numberless evils to which we are subject, are the effects of sin, and can exist nowhere but in a sinful world and amongst sinful creatures. Adam's perceiving that he was naked; that the divine goodness had in part deserted him, and that he was fallen into want and weakness, were the first intimations that were given him of natural evil: as remorse of conscience and fear of the divine indignation, were the first strokes he felt from sin or moral evil. Reason as well as scripture declares, that in departing from God, man departs from his happiness. We are unhappy, because we are unholy: so closely are sin and sorrow connected.

But tho' we are convinced of the deformity and odiousness of vice and intemperance, and that they have a direct tendency to destroy our health, character and estate; and tho' we see and are charmed with the rectitude

titude and loveliness of virtue, and are sensible that it is in general its own reward, even in this life ; yet such is the almost irresistible influence of habit, such the propensity of our nature to that which is evil, that contrary to our better knowledge and interest, we too frequently make a wrong choice, and herein verify the remark of the Roman poet,

*Video meliora proboque,
Deteriora sequor.*

Or as our own countryman very happily expresses it ;

Vice is a monster of such horrid mien,
That to be hated, needs but to be seen ;
Yet seen too oft, familiar with her face,
We first endure, then pity, then embrace.

Mr. Locke tells us, that it is indolence, inconsideration, and the weak and narrow constitution of our minds, that makes us take wrong courses to attain happiness. All own that plenty, and the conveniences of life, are preferable to indolence and want ; yet so long as a man is content with the lat-

ter, and finds no great uneasiness in it, he moves not. How many are to be found that have had lively representations set before their minds of the unspeakable joys of heaven, which they acknowledge both possible and probable too, who yet would be content to take up with the transient, unsatisfying pleasures of the world? And thus, like spendthrift heirs, they are apt to judge a little in hand, better than a great deal to come, and so, for small matters in possession, part with great ones in reversion. But whatever false notions, or shameful neglect of what is in their power, may put men out of their way to happiness, and distract them, as we see, into so many different courses of life; this is yet certain, that morality, established upon its true foundations, cannot but determine the choice in any one that will but consider. And he that will not be so far a rational creature, as to reflect seriously upon infinite happiness and misery, must needs condemn himself as not making that use of his understanding which he ought to do. The rewards and punishments of another life, which the Almighty hath

hath established, as the inforcements of his laws, are of weight enough to determine his choice against whatever pleasure or pain this life can shew, when the eternal state is but considered in its bare possibility, which no body can make any doubt of. He that will allow exquisite and eternal happiness to be but the possible consequence of a good life here, and the contrary state the possible reward of a bad one, must own himself to judge very much amiss, if he does not conclude that a virtuous life with the certain expectation of everlasting bliss, which may come, is to be preferred to a vicious one, with the fear of that dreadful state of misery, which, it is very possible, may overtake the guilty, or at best the terrible uncertain hope of annihilation. This is evidently so, tho' the virtuous life had nothing but pain, and the vicious continual pleasure; which yet is for the most part quite otherwise; and wicked men have not much the odds to brag of, even in their present possession, nay all things considered, have, I think, the worst part here. But when infinite happiness is put in one scale against infinite misery in the

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the other ; if the worst that comes to the pious man, (if he mistakes,) be the best that the wicked man can attain to, if he be in the right, who can without madness run the venture ? Who in his wits would chuse to come within a possibility of infinite misery, which if he miss, there is yet nothing to be got, if his expectation come to pass ? If the good man be in the right, he is eternally happy, if he mistakes, he is not miserable, he feels nothing. On the other side, if the wicked be in the right, he is not happy ; if he mistakes, he is infinitely miserable (1).

Many people are apt to complain of the vanity of human life : but life is not vain, unless we make it so by our follies and pursuing wrong courses. We have a business upon our hands, which is not vain. Whilst

(1) The Spectator, in one of his papers, mentions a certain lewd young fellow, who seeing an aged hermit go by him barefoot, cries out to him, Father, you are in a very miserable condition, if there is not another world. True, son, replied the hermit, but what is thy condition, if there be ?

we are virtuous, we shall never grow dissatisfied with life ; for dissatisfaction arises chiefly from a wretched satiety, which virtue never knows. Thus the author of *Telemachus* says, “ Can one see virtue without loving her, can one love her without being happy ? ”

The reason why many wise men have complained of the vanity of life, was perhaps, that they pryed too deeply into things, and bewildered themselves ; or conscious of their own iniquities, have tried to deceive themselves, and not to distinguish the real cause of the evil. But, if we do really and sincerely believe the being of a God, that the soul is immortal, and that there are future rewards and punishments, we shall not complain of the vanity of human life.

The utmost we can hope for in this world, is contentment. If we aim at any thing higher, we shall meet with nothing but vexation and disappointment. And there is only one way to arrive at it, and that is by cultivating virtue. It is virtue that inspires
content,

content, sets bounds to our wants and desires, and gives a true relish to all our enjoyments. We too frequently overlook the blessings we enjoy, and wish for those that are out of our reach ; or perhaps we make use of unwarrantable means to accomplish our ends. The compass of men's wishes, as founded in reason and nature, is very narrow ; but fancy and opinion have no bounds. To a moderate man a clean room, clean cloaths, plain food and independence is a competency. If to these health is added, with some opportunities of doing good, 'tis more than competency, it is virtuous indulgence.

It is generally understood (you observe page 94.) that the ills of this world are very unequally divided and improperly proportioned. They are thought to be frequently inflicted where they are not due, and withheld where they ought to fall, to be dealt in greater quantities to good than to bad men, and sometimes to both indiscrimi-

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minately and alike (*m*). Such an apparent disposition may induce superficial observers to conclude that physical evil has no more to do with vice than virtue, is a strange unaccountable phenomenon, and moves in the present sphere of human beings, only as chance and accident direct it.

The unequal distribution of good and evil in this world, hath puzzled and embarrassed the reason and judgment of many a good and contemplative man. As Mr. Wollaston seems to have set this case in a very fair and just light, I cannot do better than quote him in his words.

ist " We are not always certain," says he, " who are good, who wicked. If we trust to fame and reports, these may proceed on the one hand from partial friendship or flat-

(*m*) 'Tis an observation made by the wise man, that he had seen a just man perish in his righteousness, and the wicked prolong his life in his wickedness.—And again, that all things come alike to all, that there is one event to the righteous and to the wicked, to him that sweareth, as to him that feareth an oath.----But if we take in the consideration of an after-reckoning, the misfortunes which be-

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tery; on the other, from ill-natured surmises and construction of things (*n*), envy or malice; and on either from small matters aggrandized, from mistake or from the unskilful relation even of truth itself. Opposite parties make a merit of blackening their adversaries and brightning their friends, undeservedly and unmeasurably. And to idle companions and gossips it is diversion, and what makes the principal part of their conversation, to rehearse the characters of men, dressed up out of their own dreams and inventions. And beside all this, the good or bad repute of men depends in great measure upon mean people, who carry their stories from family to family, and propagate them very fast; like little insects, which

fall the good, and the prosperity with which the wicked are sometimes favoured, will be properly adjusted in the final issue.

(*n*) How frequent is it to see a man miss of preferment, partly perhaps thro' timidity and self-diffidence, partly thro' some few indiscreet acts, but principally owing to the sly insinuations of some false friend or orher, who has taken care to represent his character in not the most amiable light to him, who would otherwise have been his friend, his patron and benefactor.

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lay apace, and the less the faster. There are few, very few, who have the opportunity and the will and the ability to represent things truly. Besides the matters of fact themselves, there are many circumstances, which, before sentence is passed, ought to be known and weighed, and scarce even can be known but to the person himself, who is concerned. He may have other views and another sense of things, than his judges have. And what he understands, what he feels, what he intends, may be a secret confined to his own breast. A man may thro' bodily indispositions and faults in his constitution, which it is not in his power to correct, he may be subject to starts and inadvertencies or obnoxious to snares, which he cannot be aware of, or thro' want of information or proper helps, he may labour under invincible errors and act as in the dark. In which case he may do things, which are in themselves wrong, and yet be innocent, or at least rather be pitied than censured with severity. Or perhaps the censurer, notwithstanding these people talk as if they were infallible, may be mistaken

himself in his opinion, and judge that to be wrong, which in truth is right. Nothing more common than this. Ignorant and superstitious wretches measure the actions of lettered and philosophical men by the tales of their nurses or illiterate parents or companions, or by the fashion of the country ; and people of differing religions judge and condemn each other by their own tenets, when both of them cannot be in the right, and it is well if either of them are. To which may be added, that the true characters of men must depend chiefly upon the unseen part of their lives ; since the truest and best religion is most private, and the greatest wickedness endeavours to be so. Some are modest and hide their virtues ; others hypocritical, and conceal their vices under greater shews of sanctity, goodness, or something that is spacious. So that it is many times hard to discern, to which of the two sorts, the good or the bad, a man ought to be aggregated."

2. " It rarely happens that we are competent judges of the good or bad fortune
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of other people. That which is disagreeable to one, is many times agreeable to another, or disagreeable in a less degree. If one man can carry a weight of four or five hundred pounds, as well as another can the weight of one hundred ; by these different weights they will be equally loaded. And so the same poverty and disgrace, the same wounds, &c. do not give the same pain to all men. The apprehension of but a vein to be opened, is worse to some, than the apparatus to an execution is to others ; and a word may be more terrible and sensible to tender natures, than a sword is to the senseless and intrepid breed. The same may be said with respect to enjoyments. Men have different tastes, and the use of the same thing does not beget equal pleasure in all. Besides we scarce ever know the whole case. We do not see the inward stings and secret pains, which many of those men carry about them, whose external splendor and flourishing estate is so much admired by beholders ; nor perhaps sufficiently consider the silent pleasures of a lower fortune, arising from temperance, moderate desires, easy reflections,

reflections, or consciousness of knowledge and truth, with other pleasures of the mind, much greater many times than those of the body. Before we can pronounce another happy or otherwise, we should know all his enjoyments and all his sufferings. Many misfortunes are compensated by some larger endowments and extraordinary felicities in other respects. But suppose the pleasures of some and the sufferings of some others, to be just as they appear, still we know not the consequences of them. The pleasures of those men may lead to miseries greater than those of the latter, and be in reality the greater misfortune. And again, the sufferings of these may be preludes to succeeding advantages. So that indeed we know not how to name these outward appearances of particular men, nor which to call happiness, which the contrary, unless we know the inward sense of the persons themselves, all their circumstances, that will be hereafter consequent upon their present success or adversity."

3. "Men ought to be considered as members of families, nations, mankind, the universe,

verse, from which they cannot be separated; and then from the condition of their being it will appear, that there will be great inequalities; that the innocent cannot but be sometimes involved in general calamities or punishments, nor the guilty but share in public prosperities, and that the good of the whole society or kind is to be regarded, prosperity to the present pleasure of any individual, if they happen to clash."

"Lastly, if the virtuous man has undergone more in this life, than it would be reasonable he should suffer, if there was no other; yet those sufferings may not be unreasonable, if there is another. For they may be made up to him by such enjoyments, as it would be reasonable to prefer, even with those previous mortifications, before the pleasures of this life with the loss of them. On the other side, if vicious and wicked men do prosper and make a figure; yet it is possible their sufferings hereafter may be such, as that the excess of them above their past enjoyments, may be equal to the just mulct of their villainies and wickedness.

wickedness. And perhaps it is (as I have always been apt to think) in order to convince us of the certainty of a future state, that good and bad men not being respectively treated according to reason in this life, have been so numerous."

And here a thought suggests itself to me, which I was not before aware of ; but which however shews the strong propensity of our nature to censure others for faults we can readily overlook or excuse in ourselves. Upon reviewing what I had already written, and reflecting upon it, I began to consider that I had given you but too just a handle to retort upon me the same kind of objection which I had made against you ; I mean, that I had not only expatiated, in a very diffuse and prolix manner, upon things quite foreign to that which was, pretendedly at least, the original and principal intention of this (alreday too long) letter, but likewise superinduced large quotations, from various authors ; and all this merely for childish parade and pedantic ostentation, or rather, in order to swell my book to a greater

greater size, and thereby enhance the price of it. I shall not attempt to exculpate myself from this charge, any farther than just to hint, that being fully convinced of the oversight, I was at first minded to leave out, or however, to retrench and curtail several of the passages I had cited from others. But when I reflected more maturely about it, and considered that I should, by such an abridgment, deprive my readers of some of the best and most valuable parts of this work, I was determined at all events to let things remain as they were. And here I would, once for all, desire the good natured reader, not to be greatly offended at me, as for other slips and inadvertencies, that may have escaped me, so particularly for not being always scrupulously exact in specifying the title, volume, or particular page of the book I have quoted; nay if sometimes even the author's name, with whose works I have made free, has not been so much as mentioned, I have only to say in my own vindication, that I have precedents enow before me, which, if properly called for, I could produce to justify such omissions. But

dropping these considerations, let us once more return to the essay.

Towards the conclusion of your first volume, you express yourself in the following remarkable manner. As brute beasts have suffered with man the injuries of the fall, as they have perished with him in deluges, conflagrations, famines, pestilences, destructions of the world, and in short, in all great and capital calamities, they will also attend him in his final deliverance, be restored when he is restored, and have place in those happy regions, where nature shall reassume the splendor and elegance of her pristine forms, the eternal God appear as he is, and every thing be apprehensive of him. This, you say, you design to prove by propositions, with proper scholia or arguments, and to deduce such conclusions, as those are conceived to suggest. How you have succeeded in your design, we shall see by and by.

As an ancient towering castle, which at a distance not only exhibits a venerable appearance

pearance, but also seems to be strong and firmly built and able at the least to hold out a long siege, if not impregnable ; but upon a nearer approach, and when viewed by a skilful eye, proves to be decayed, full of breaches, and ready to tumble into ruins with the lightest shock : so your propositions, and the arguments you support them with, may appear at the first glance, and to a superficial reader, not only very plausible, but to carry with them an air of conviction and truth ; which however when thoroughly scrutinized and fairly weighed in the balance, will be found to be extremely faulty, wanting and deficient.

The first proposition with the arguments, deductions, conclusions, &c. taking up pretty near half your second volume, gives me occasion to suppose, that you have bestowed uncommon pains upon it, in order to establish and render it, if possible, unanswerable. And indeed, as it boldly asserts, that the scriptures plainly intimate that brute animals have a being in future, you could not but be very sensible that the main stress

of your fabric depended upon this pillar, so that if you failed in making this good, the whole structure would of course give way and fall to the ground. But let us hear the proposition itself.

PROPOSITION I.

The scriptures plainly intimate, that brute animals will have a being in future, and partake in some degree of those benefits, which shall be conferred after the universal change.

Particularly this appears to be the clear sense of some verses in the 8th chap. of the epistle to the Romans. These verses begin thus: (o) For the earnest expectation of the creature waiteth for the manifestation

(b) But hold, Mr. Dean, let us take breath a little, before we proceed any farther in St. Paul's epistles.—I should expect that, as you roundly affirm that the scriptures plainly intimate that brute animals will have a being in future, you would have given us a crowd of texts, both out of the old and new testament, to confirm and prove your assertion. But instead of this, you have not favoured us with so much as one single passage out of the old testament. With the same expedition and silence you step

of the sons of God. For the creature was made subject to vanity, not willingly, but by reason of him, who hath subjected the same, in hope. Because the creature itself shall be delivered from the bondage of corruption into the glorious liberty of the sons of God. For we know that the whole creation groaneth and travaileth in pain toge-

over the four evangelists and the acts of the apostles, and the very first text you produce to give light to your cause, is perhaps one of the darkest passages in all St. Paul's epistles,

I take it to be a good way, in order to come at the true sense of difficult parts of scripture, to compare them with those that are plain and easy to be understood. Now on this subject, relating to the souls of brutes, whether they be immortal, as those of men are, why did not you carefully examine Moses's account of the creation, and every other part of the bible, that could give you any information?

Moses tells us, Gen. chap. 1. v. 25. God made the beast of the earth after his kind, &c. Ainsworth writes thus upon the word beast; "Beast or wild beast: named in Hebrew, of life or liveliness, which is most seen in the wild beast."—In Pukei R. Eliezer chap. 11. the Jewish doctors say, These that were created out of the earth, their souls and their bodies were of the earth, and when

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ther until now ; And not only they, but ourselves also, which have the first fruits of the spirit, even we ourselves groan within ourselves, waiting for the adoption, to wit, the redemption of our bodies.

In your remarks and comment upon these verses, there does not appear, in some places

they die, they return to the place where they were created, as is said in ps. 104. v. 29. Thou takest away their spirit, they die : and another scripture saith, And the spirit of a beast, that goeth downward to the earth.—Again, on the term, *inspired* or *blew*, Gen. 2. 7. Ainsworth observes, This sheweth man's spirit not to be of the earth, but of nothing, by the insufflation of God, and so differing from the spirit of beasts, as Solomon observeth, Eccles. 3. 21.

Bishop Patrick makes the following remark upon the words, “ And God breathed into his nostrils the breath of life :” This being said of no other creature, leads us to conceive, not only that the soul of man is a distinct thing, of a different original from the body ; but that a more excellent spirit was put into him by God, (as appears by its operations,) than into other animals. For tho’ the simple speech of *inspiring him with the breath of life*, would not prove this ; yet Moses speaking in the plural number, that God breathed into him *Nischnath chayim*, the *breath or spirit of lives*, it plainly denotes, not only that spirit, which

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that precision and perspicuity one could wish. For you first tell us, that by the word, creature, is understood the things that are made, the visible world, and all it contains, living and lifeless, sensitive and insensitive, as contradistinguished to man, who is not here included in the term creature. But afterwards you seem to use the word in a more limited sense, to signify only such things or beings, as are endued with sense

makes man *breathe* and *move*, but *think*; also *reason* and *discourse*.

The assembly of divines, in their annotations upon the word, *image*, Gen. 1. 26. observe, that the image of God in man, consisted not in any bodily shape, but in the nature of the soul, as it is a spiritual and immortal substance. And on the 7th v. of the 2d chap. The Lord animated or inspired him with a living and reasonable soul or spirit, (which presently appeared by breath at his nostrils) for the soul of man is not educed, derived or fetched out of any power in the matter of the body, nor made of any matter at all, as the body is; but as it is a spirit immaterial and immortal, so it had its immediate original from the Father of Spirits.

Breath of life.] Heb. *breath of lives*. For a man hath a vegetative life with trees and plants, a sensitive life with beasts; and above them both, an intellectual or reasonable life with angels.

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and life, man alone excepted. Again, you affirm that all nature, in some respect or other, and in some measure and degrees, expects a future state of glory. But you are not so obliging as to inform us in what measures and degrees, nor in what respect, all nature expects this. And one

Juvenal, tho' a heathen, seems to have had some idea of this, when he saith,

— separat hoc nos

A grege mutorum, atque ideo venerabile soli
Sortiti ingenium, divinorumque capaces,
Atque exercendis capiendisq[ue] artibus apti,
Sensum a cœlesti demissum traximus arce,
Cujus egent prona et terram spectantia. Mundi
Principio indulsit communis conditor illis
Tantum *animas*, nobis *animum* quoque.

And Cicero, by the light of nature, could say, Quicquid est illud, quod sentit, quod sapit, quod vult, quod viget, cœleste et divinum est, ideoque æternum.

Iren. l. 5. c. 15. as quoted by the author of *Bibliotheca Biblica*, on Gen. 2. 7. has these words. 'Tis false doctrine that the immortal substance of the mind, which God himself breathed into us, was generated along with the mortal and frail substance of the body.

Cyril. Alex. de Adriat. lib. 10. resolves the immortality of the soul into the virtue and support of the divine breath, which he elsewhere explains by a metaphor of signature or seal, stamped upon human nature.

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may very easily assign a reason for it, and that is, because you cannot. In one place you say, that the manifestation of the sons of God, which the creature is said to expect, is that visible distinction, which shall be made betwixt them, and unbelievers and hypocrites at the last day. And

Man must undoubtedly be admitted to a noble share of divine intelligence and ideas, since these were a privilege breathed into him by his maker at his creation, a dignity and eminence of nature superior to that of all other animals.

Theodoret speaks to the same purpose, and infers the immateriality of the soul from the very nature of a divine insufflation. Qu. in Gen. 2. 3.

From POOLE's Annotations.

Gen. 1. 26. Quest. Wherein doth the image of God in man consist? Ans. It principally consists and most eminently appears in man's soul. 1. In its nature and substance, as it is like God, spiritual, invisible, immortal, &c.

Chap. 2. 7. And the Lord God, &c. This is an emphatical phrase, sufficiently implying that the soul of man was of a quite differing nature and higher extraction and original, than the *souls of beasts, which together with their bodies are said to be brought forth by the earth.* Gen. 1. 24.

Breath of lives : Either to shew the continuance of this breath or soul, both in this life and in the life to come ; or to note the various degrees or kinds of life, which this one

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why

why should brutes, I pray you, wait to see this? Will it any ways avail them at the last day, who are true believers, or who hypocrites? Can they possibly be interested in this matter? but in another place you tell us, that the chief object of the creature's

breath worketh in us; the life of plants, in growth and nourishment; the life of beasts, in sense and motion; and the life of a man, in reason and understanding.

I need make no remarks upon the comments of these learned divines. You see they are express against you, and their authority, one would imagine, will far outweigh yours with all unprejudiced persons.

Proceed we now to your beloved text out of St. Paul's epistle to the Romans. You give it as your sense and that of others, that by this passage the apostle intended to teach the future life of brutes. The creature, (you say, vol. 2. p. 5.) is the visible world and all it contains, living and lifeless, sensitive and insensitive, as contradistinguished from man. And again, page 8. The creature, as before defined, was made subject to vanity, to instability and change of being and condition, not willingly, that is, not by any choice of its own.

As soon as you begin to explain, you begin to bewilder and lose yourself. For how could you think of making St. Paul use the word creature for the visible world and all it contains, living and lifeless, sensitive and insensitive, as contradistinguished from man, and then make him say,
earnest

earnest expectation, is a freedom and exemption from the evils of instability, decay and dissolution, to which the bodies of living beings, and all material forms are universally subject.

You confess that you do not know, that any thing could more effectually banish all

that the lifeless and insensitive part of the creation were subjected to vanity unwillingly and not by any choice of their own. Have they sense or will, to chuse or refuse any thing ?

But afterwards you shuffle, and alter your mode of expression, and instead of the visible world, and all it contains, living and lifeless, &c. you drop the visible world, and all it contains, excepting only such things or beings as are endued with sense and life ; and these you keep still, I suppose, in contradistinction to man, who is not included in the term creature in this place. You are a most extraordinary logician, I must confess. Watts can be of no service to you : Locke and Sanderson, I find, knew no more than the *dreaming* expositors, as you are pleased to call them.

I shall just observe to you, that in these sensible explanations of yours, you speak in the plural number, as tho' you were many. I hope you are singular in your judgment. I should be sorry there were others like you ; but if you know your fellow, for your own reputation you should have named him.

distrust

distrust of men concerning a future state of glory, confirm their hopes and strengthen their belief of it, than a consideration that all nature below them had in one respect or another a general expectation of it.

A strange way of reasoning this ; that we should have a stronger assurance of a future

In the 27th page, you break forth into the following most pathetic exclamation. Oh ! dreadful thought, must they (brute animals) then have an interest in future worlds ? What man is he, that can bear the idea of such a thing ? And therefore what good man is there, who would not rather pervert the signification of a thousand texts, than submit to an explanation of one so repugnant to his sentiments ? Maugre all the clearest evidence upon earth, he never can allow brute animals an existence in another state.

I shall at present decline making any remarks upon these very exceptionable words, and proceed to page 43, where you thus go on. " Hence then, since the opinion that St. Paul in the passage we have considered, means the Gentile world, is full of absurdities and contradictions, it is evident that the sense we have put upon it, at the beginning of this book, is the only true sense." But this will bear a dispute ; for it is no good consequence to say, it is *this*, because not *that* ; since it may be neither. The opinion you oppose may be false, as well as that you contend for ; since there are several other ways of rendering that passage, some of which may be the true sense.

state,

state, by believing what we see no reason to believe, or rather by believing (if such a thing be possible) what gives the lie to the testimony of our senses. For pray, tell me, did you or any man living ever perceive the least appearance in inanimate matter, or even in brutes, of their having any notion or apprehension at all, much less an earnest expectation of a future state? So far from this, that from the ape to the oyster, I defy you to find any creature endowed with faculties capable of entertaining a promise, or conceiving any prospect of their redemption. Nay, they seem not to have the least idea of religion—cannot be taught that there is a God—that they are creatures, or that there are, in any sense of the word,

In the following page, you tell us: “We might have here observed, that the existence of creatures under the same forms had never been discontinued but for sin; that this is a scripture doctrine *, and therefore a good argument for the endless duration of creatures of all degrees. We might also have produced other scriptures in favour of the futurity of brutes; but shall at present content ourselves with the before cited passages, as sufficient for this purpose.

* In what part of scripture is this doctrine to be found?

sons of God to be made manifest. But all these and more the Gentiles had powers to learn.

How then can it confirm our hopes in any thing, to be told what we find contradicted by the concurrent testimony of universal experience and daily observation? Nay, the very scope and design of what the apostle was there treating upon, plainly shews that he had another, a much higher and nobler object in view, than either inanimate matter or the brute creation, as is evident from the contrast he points out in the 23d verse. For says he, And not only *they*

So I find it is come to what I expected. No text is brought to prove what you say the scriptures plainly intimate, out of the old testament, the evangelists, or the acts. But after you have puzzled yourself with one of St. Paul's dark passages, and abused the commentators for agreeing in a sense of it, differing from your own, you pretend you could have brought other texts in your favour, but will be content to rest your cause upon this one, as sufficient.

When commentators are against you, nothing they say can please. Nay, you do not stick to charge them with torturing a thousand texts, rather than they will own a truth they do not like. But at other times you can pass
but

but ourselves also, which have the first fruits of the spirit, even we ourselves groan within ourselves, &c. That is, we who by being made christians have received peculiar privileges above others, even we also groan as well as *they*, who have no such advantages. And what **THEY** must this mean? Undoubtedly all the rest of mankind, who were yet

by many texts that are against you, quietly relinquish others that you say are for you, and rest your cause upon one, that has neither the proposition nor the terms you contend for. How often is man said, in the new testament, to be immortal! but where is it once said so of any thing below him? Christ took upon him the seed of Abraham, not the nature of angels, in order to redeem lost man from sin and from death. Shew me, if you can, where his death is imputed to procure future life to brutes. Is it any where said in scripture, that brutes were in a better or happier condition before, than after the fall of man? Is it any where said, or can it be inferred, that the fall brought any damage to them? Is the manner of expressing their creation, and that of man, in Moses's writings, the same? Was not the breath of life breathed into man by God, whereby man became a living soul? But the earth brought forth animals. If the scripture has any where plainly intimated your opinion, why have you not given us one text, that does intimate this? That you have not done. The passage you argue from, has not the terms, brute, animal, future life, nor any thing to your

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in a state of nature, and not within the covenant of grace. The latter (that is, the unenlightened part of mankind, who were held captive to sin and satan) groaned, yea travailed in pain, as it were, to be delivered from the burden of the curse denounced upon Adam, and in him upon all his posterity.

The former, that is, christians, who by being first favoured with the gospel dispensation, and endued with the gifts and graces of the holy spirit, may be said to have received the first fruits of the spirit; I say, christians groaned not only to be delivered from the evils, wherewith they were still encompassed, such as tribulation and distress, persecution and famine; but also that their bodies might be redeemed, *i. e.* freed from pain and corruption, and rendered glorious, immortal and supremely happy.

purpose. And if it had, the sense of this text being disputable, requires your bringing some plainer text, to prove this hard one by: for it is too barefaced, to bring the text in dispute to prove itself.

Before

Before we give a paraphrase upon these verses, we will make bold to ask you a few plain, but pertinent questions.

And first, as the apostle Peter tells us, there are some things in St. Paul's writings hard to be understood, which they that are unlearned and unstable wrest, as they do also the other scriptures, unto their own destruction, may not this passage very possibly be one of them?

If from an obscure text or two of scripture, new doctrines may be established, what and where will be the end of it?

May not all the different sects, into which the christian religion is at present so unhappily divided, at this rate prove their erroneous, and even heretical tenets and opinions? But to come nearer to the point.

As you are willing to allow that the term *creature*, in other passages of the new testament, is made use of to denote the human species and them only, (particularly in that

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last charge of our Saviour to his disciples, just before his ascension, "Go, and preach the gospel to every creature,) why may it not have the same meaning here? Will it not bear that construction with propriety?

Is not Christ called in the old testament, the expectation of the Gentiles, and the desire of all nations.

Was there not a general expectation both of Jew and Gentile, that some illustrious and extraordinary personage would make his appearance in the world, about the time that the Son of God manifested himself in the flesh? (*p*)

Are not idols in scripture called vanities, and was not the heathen world universally sunk into idolatry?

(*p*) I was once of opinion, that a small error might possibly have crept into the original, and that the words rendered, "manifestation of the sons of God," should be, "manifestation of the son of God." But having no ancient manuscript or printed copy to produce, to support and give a sanction to the conjecture, I had done. But some

Was

Was mankind willingly, *i. e.* of their own choice, or thro' their own default merely, thus subjected to idolatry? Was it not rather the effect of Adam's apostacy from his maker, whereby man's understanding became clouded, and over-run with ignorance and error, his will depraved and alienated from God, so that all the cogitations of his heart were only evil continually?

Was it not owing to this breach, that sin, disease and death, have made such havock and devastation in the world?

Had not mankind then great reason to groan and travail in pain, as it were, to be

will perhaps ask, how the Gentiles could properly be said to expect the son of God, as a redeemer, when they had no knowledge or prospect of such a thing? In answer to this, it is to be considered, that according to scripture style, men are sometimes said to expect and desire that, of which they have no distinct idea or thought. Thus Solomon says, Wicked men desire death and love it. And as all men naturally desire happiness, and as Christ and his gospel are the only means to arrive at happiness; so the Gentiles may, in this sense, be said to expect Christ, to desire to know him, and to have his gospel preached unto them.

delivered from the burden of these evils, and impatiently to cry out, Who shall deliver me from this body of death ?

May not the bondage of corruption, from which the creature was to be delivered, include all the evils, of what nature soever they may be, that are incident to the human species ?

Is not the Gospel dispensation frequently shadowed out to us, as a state of liberty ; and that very justly ; not only in contradistinction to the yoke of Jewish ceremonies, but also to the bondage of corruption, in which the Gentiles were entangled ?

Are not christians the children of God by adoption ? Is there not a figure in rhetoric, whereby the whole is put for a part, and *vice versa* ? Does not St. Paul sometimes speak hyperbolically ? May not then the words, " the whole creation," mean only the generality of mankind ?

May

May not the first fruits of the spirit, which St. Paul says, that he and others had received, signify the sanctifying graces, enlightning influences and inward supports of the Holy Ghost, whereof as they were first endued with them, they might properly be said to have received the first fruits?

Lastly, tho' the first converts to christianity were in some measure exempted from the dominion of those evils, to which the rest of mankind were unhappily exposed; yet had they not still sufficient reason to groan, and earnestly to long to put off this earthly, perishing tabernacle, with all its incumberances, and to be redeemed, or cloathed anew with a body glorious, incorruptible and immortal?

Having premised thus much, I will now give you the sense of these verses, as paraphrased by Dr. Stanhope.

Romans 8.

V. 18. The sufferings I mention (v. 17.) how sharp soever, are yet rendered very
supportable

supportable by the certain prospect of that glorious reward, to be hereafter obtained, and to which they bear no manner of proportion.

V. 19. For this, which shall one day prove us to be the sons of an immortal God, mankind in general eagerly expect.

V. 20. For all mankind is become liable to corruption, not by choice, but thro' the just dispensation of God, who hath inflicted death upon them ; yet this not without end or hope.

V. 21. For a time is coming, when this death shall be succeeded by a happy immortality, and this effect of Adam's sin taken off from his posterity.

V. 22. The sense and burden whereof at present lies so heavy, that the apprehensions of it, and the afflictions of the present life, are like so many labour throws and pangs towards that better life.

V. 23. Of which we, who have received the gospel and grace of Christ, have likewise our share, and with great earnestness do long
for

for the evidence and completion of our sonship, even the final rescuing of these now afflicted bodies from death and corruption, and their admission into our eternal inheritance with Christ, in the kingdom of his and our Father.

COMMENT.

I shall not trouble my reader, says he, with the great variety of constructions, which learned men have put upon this scripture ; but having in my paraphrase set down that which, in my apprehension, is as reasonable and natural as any, I will endeavour to render it plain and useful, by discoursing briefly upon in.

Here you have the full and clear sense of Dr. Stanhope on this place ; and his fame, as a divine, is too great for either my praise or your reproach.

The other writers of note, who have treated upon this passage, and agree in general with Dr. Stanhope, are Dr. Hammond, Dr. Lightfoot, Mr. Locke, Pyle, Wells, and
Burkett.

Burkett. See also the annotations by the assembly of divines, and the paraphrase upon St. Paul's epistles, said to be written by Bishop Fell, who in his notes upon this passage, says, The beasts are subject *naturally* and so *willingly* to vanity and dissolution. No curse upon them is read of since their creation, by which they became so ; nor any promise elsewhere for these, as for heaven and earth ever to be restored.

Dr. Whitby treats largely upon these verses, and concludes thus—I differ only from the Fathers (I presume, he means Tertullian and Origen) in this interpretation, as to this single circumstance, that I do not extend this desire *of the redemption of the body from corruption to brute beasts and insensate creatures*, but only to mankind in general, subject by Adam's fall to mortality.

I shall only quote one divine more, and that is Dr. Doddridge, who in his notes upon the 19th v. observes, This and the following verses have been generally, and not without reason, accounted as difficult as any
part

part of the epistle. The difficulty has perhaps been something increased by rendering *ktisis* creation in one clause, and creature in another. To explain it as chiefly referring to the brutal or inanimate creation is insufferable, since the day of the redemption of our bodies will be attended with the conflagration, which will put an end to them.

These are the writers upon this part of the epistle to the Romans, which I have had an opportunity of consulting; and I find them one and all against you. But this does not surprize me half so much, as to see you cry out, (page 20.) Oh noble thought of profound commentators! And again, p. 24. formed only to support a weak hypothesis of dreaming expositors.

Fie, Mr. Dean, how could you for shame have the insolence to make use of such abusive language against a number of learned and worthy authors, whom every scholar and divine may think it an honour to have of his opinion upon any abstruse and difficult part of scripture.

L.

PRO.

P R O P O S I T I O N II.

The doctrine of a future existence of brute creatures, is maintained by some Jewish writers of the first class, and by some of the christian fathers, as Tertullian and Origen.

Tertullian makes the following remark upon the foregoing words of St. Paul, " And the creature itself shall be delivered, &c." Then observes he, " there shall be an end of death, when the devil, its chief master, shall go away into the fire, which God has prepared for him and his angels; when the manifestation of the sons of God shall release the world from evil, at present universally subject to it; when the innocence and purity of nature being restored, beasts shall live in harmony, and infants shall play with serpents, when the father shall have subjected his enemies to his son, and put all things in subjection under his feet."

Most of the above phrases, such as infants playing with serpents, &c. were originally intended to prefigure the happy
change,

change, that was to succeed upon the promulgation of the gospel ; or when the fulness of the Gentiles was come, and the Jews should make one flock under one shepherd.

Little to your purpose is what Origen says of the sun and moon, viz. that these great bodies wait for the manifestation of the sons of God.

Some have imagined that the above passages from Tertullian and Origen have a reference to the thousand years reign of the saints with Christ upon earth, which was believed and taught by several of the Fathers. However it be, the character and authority of both the above fathers among divines is so well known, that it shews a weak cause indeed, that, after all diligent and industrious search into the writings of the ancient fathers, can be supported by none but them. You are not now to learn, I suppose, that both Tertullian and Origen were long ago condemned for heretical opinions.

The passages you cite from the Jewish writers, are so very frivolous and insignificant, that they merit no notice.

PROPOSITION III.

Reason declares in favour of the future existence of brutes, by determining that brutes have souls.

That brutes have souls, that is, that they are possess'd of a living, immaterial principle, is conjectured from their being endued with sensation, passion and a principle of self-motion. But does it therefore follow, that because they enjoy these privileges, they must live in a future state?

If Des Cartes and others have made brutes into mere machines, (*q*) it is no more than what a late writer has attempted to make

(*q*) While some exalt the nature of brutes too high, others would depress it too low. There have not been wanting persons weak enough to assert that brutes are men in disguise, like the companions of Ulysses, enchanted by Circe; that their souls were originally and intrinsically as perfect and excellent as ours, and that all the difference
man

man into. If they have asserted that brutes are insensible, as to all their operations; that they eat without pleasure, cry out with pain, &c. I know no-body that is so weak as to give credit to their gross notions. They are undoubtedly something more than mere automata. Our very senses convince us, that brutes see and hear and smell and taste and feel in the same manner with men. But notwithstanding this, it is manifest that in most of their operations, they act by mere instinct. You say that this term is at pre-

between us and them, arises merely from the disadvantageous organization of their bodies, which are not so well disposed as ours are, to assist the intellectual operations of their souls. So that, according to them, if the soul of Socrates had been lodged in a hog, instead of a human body, it would never have arrived to any higher attainments, than those common to its fellow animals. This was the opinion of the ancient Pythagoreans and Metempsychosists. Again, others, as Descartes and his followers, are for making them into mere machines, and will allow them no more sense or perception, than a clock or a watch.

But Father Bougeant's opinion is still more wild and romantic, than either of these. He will needs have it, that all the animal functions and operations of the brute creation are entirely owing to the operation of evil spirits, who are the moving principle in every one of them.

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sent vague and indeterminate. For my own part, I take it to be that sagacity and natural inclination in brutes, which supplies the place of reason in mankind ; which implanted quality in them excels, in most instances, the most elaborate mechanical skill in man. It is by some defined, an immediate impression from the first mover, or the divine energy acting in the creatures.

The devils, says he, from the very moment they had sinned, were reprobate, and doomed to burn for ever in hell. But the execution of the verdict brought against them, is reserved for the day of the final judgment. Therefore, 'till doom's day comes, God, in order not to let so many legions of reprobate spirits to be of no use, has distributed them thro' the several spaces of the world, to serve the designs of his providence, and make his omnipotence to appear.

Some continuing in their natural state, busy themselves in tempting men, in seducing and tormenting them, as Job's devil, and those that lay hold on human bodies, or by the ministry of forccrers and phantoms. These wicked spirits are those, whom the scripture calls the powers of darkness or the powers of the air.—With the others God makes millions of beasts of all kinds, which serve for the several uses of man, and fill the universe. By this means I can easily conceive, says he, how, on the one hand, the devils can tempt us, and on the other, how beasts can think,

In such instances, wherein brutes surpass man's utmost dexterity, they act without the application of choice or reason, just as nature impels and directs them. To instance in a crow, that has been hatched under a hen, and never saw a nest of its own species, will, at its first effort, make a nest as curiously and exactly, even to the laying of a stick, as one that was hatched by its own kind, or as ever it will be able to do afterwards. So that this principle, whatever it is, which directs it, cannot be imitation, neither yet can it be called reason. For (as Mr. Addison observes) were animals endued with reason to as great a degree as man,

know, have sentiments and a spiritual soul, without any way striking at the doctrines of religion. I am no longer surprized to see them have dexterity, forecast, memory and judgment.—Now if these proud spirits did but know their own dismal state, what an humiliation must it be to them, thus to see themselves reduced to the condition of beasts.—But yet, says he, notwithstanding the great hardships they suffer, they deserve a punishment more rigorous ; and happy it is for them, that their punishment is deferred.

An hypothesis so absurd, so inconsistent with sense and reason, as this is, could only have entered into the fertile brain of a flighty, fantastical Frenchman.

their

their buildings would be as different as ours, according to the different conveniences they would propose. Whereas every different kind of bird observes a particular plan in the structure of its nest, and all of the same species work after the same model ; so that you may be certain to what species of birds a nest belongs, without seeing the bird.

What is it but instinct, that makes a lamb, as soon as it falls from its mother, immediately and of its own accord apply itself to the teat ? It is this same principle, that directs birds of passage (as they are called) at certain seasons of the year, to go in quest of other countries, where the climate is more proper for them, than the places they leave. In short, the wisdom of brutes is confined to a few particulars, and lies in a very narrow compass. Take them out of their instinct, and you find them wholly deprived of understanding.

'Tis pity so fine and excellent a writer as Dr. Hildrop, who, perhaps, not without just reason, blames Mr. Locke for being guilty of inconsistencies in the heat of his controversy

versy with the Bishop of Worcester, did not take care not to lay himself open to the same charge. But if the great and good Mr. Locke could not entirely divest himself of prejudice, nor guard against error, we are not much to wonder at it, if writers of an inferior rank should be borne down with the torrent; especially when they are got upon some favourite topic, or are endeavouring to establish some new formed hypothesis of their own, of the truth and great utility of which they themselves, at least are fully convinced. It is not to say how ingenious, how surprizingly dexterous they are at wresting things, and molding them to their purposes.

The Doctor in his essay, entitled, Free Thoughts upon the brute creation, will not allow that the wonderful operations to be found among brutes, are owing to instinct, which term, he says, we speak of, as a mere blind impetus and unknown impulse, a kind of mechanical necessity. The notion of it is, in his opinion, obscure, useless and unnecessary for all the great ends and purposes,

poses, which it is intended to serve. He rather thinks, that all their operations may be, for aught we know, the single effects of their understanding and reason; which tho' limited and circumscribed, is however sufficient to answer the several ends of their being, and the purposes of their creation. He endeavours to prove that their souls are immaterial and spiritual, and consequently immortal—asserts that the malignant qualities visible in many of them, such as cruelty and revenge, envy and treachery, are entirely owing to the apostacy of our first parent from his maker — (Allowing that the malignity observable in them, was not originally inherent in them, we may presume it immediately became their portion, and for the punishment of fallen man.)—that 'till that fatal catastrophe, they were supremely happy, and obnoxious to no sort of pain or misery—(It is no where mentioned in scripture, that the brute creation was ever in a better or happier state, than they are at present.)—that as they were thus deeply affected by his fall, they share in his punishments, and as they have no sin to answer

answer for, (can brute creatures sin?) no just reason can be assigned, why they should not continue to exist, after the dissolution of their bodies (And I am sure no just reason can be assigned, why they should exist in a future state.)

He farther intimates, that omnipotence itself can do nothing that implies a contradiction; but that making and unmaking, creating and destroying implies no less, (Perhaps it may, to do it at one and the same instant of time) and that it is inconsistent with infinite goodness to destroy the works of his own hands—(Then it will fare better with the wicked, than is generally imagined.) And lastly, that as there is no difficulty in comprehending, nor possible danger in asserting that all the inferior creation, that fell with and in our first parent, and suffer thro' his transgression, must be reanimated; so he cannot conceive, why we should make the least doubt of it, but that they will at last be restored to their primitive happiness, and be delivered from

the present bondage of corruption into the glorious liberty of the sons of God.

PROPOSITION IV.

The notion of a soul includes immortality and endless duration of existence.

As for the essence or nature of the soul, (r) where it resides, and how it operates, it is, I believe, one among ten thousand of the desiderata, that has hitherto puzzled and perplexed the greatest philosophers. We imagine indeed, nay are fully persuaded, that we know some of its properties; as that it is an active, living principle, and that it is endued with sense, understanding and reason. We may venture to go a step farther, and say that it is capable of immortality; that is, that God can, if he pleases,

(r) Your assemblage or group of souls is grotesque and ludicrous enough.—There is, you say, the large and the narrow soul, the merry soul, the sad soul, the dull soul, the brisk soul, the sweet and the sour soul, the happy and the miserable soul, the damn'd happy soul and the damn'd jolly soul, and so on ad infinitum.

Speſtatum admiſſi, riſum teneatis, amici?
lengthen

lengthen out is duration to eternity. But all this, together with its other properties of unity, indivisibility and immateriality does not amount to a proof, that the souls of brutes are immortal. 'Tis but the Almighty's *fiat*, and your soul, my own, and that of every man living, is withdrawn to him that gave it.

It has been observed (says Mr. Wesley) that *animalcula* are discerned by the microscope in almost all water: even in that, wherein the best glasses can discover no particle of animated matter, after a few grains of pepper, or a small fragment of a plant of almost any kind has been some time in it, animals full of life are produced, and so numerous, as to equal the fluid itself in quantity. A small quantity of water taken from a ditch in summer, is found to abound in just such creatures only larger. Nay, any water set in open vessels in the summer months, will, after a few days, yield multitudes of them.

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Much to the same purpose Mr. Addison remarks, that it is amazing to consider the infinity of animals, with which the material world is stocked. Every part of matter is peopled, every green leaf swarms with inhabitants. There is scarce a single humour in the body of man, or any other animal, in which our glasses do not discover myriads of living creatures. The surface of animals is also covered with other animals, which are in the same manner the basis of other animals, that live upon it. Nay we find in the most solid bodies, as in marble itself, innumerable cells and cavities, which are crowded with such imperceptable inhabitants, as are too little for the naked eye to discover.

And must all these live again to eternity? Is such a notion agreeable to the common sense of mankind? Does reason seem to lead us to that way of thinking? Have you even so much as the appearance of one text in scripture in your favour? Is it likely that all the flies and frogs, locusts and lice, which once infested the land of *Egypt*, will
be

be reanimated, and have an endless existence in another state? If they must, I should be glad to be informed, where the last mentioned diminutive creature must then nestle. If it is to take up its residence in the same quarters it doth at present, it cannot fail of being a very unwelcome, as well as troublesome guest. And if it must not, will it not, think you, be out of its proper element? Farther, will there be seas, and lakes, and rivers in the next world, for the inhabitants of the waters to take their pastime in? This would be making it into something like an heathenish Elysium, or a Mahomedan paradise (/). Whereas, I always was of opinion, that the enjoyments

(/) Had you professed yourself to be a millenarian, and only asserted that brute creatures were to have a being in future, after the first resurrection, for a thousand years; few, I dare say, would have been much surprized at the assertion.—Those that would be glad to see the opinion of the millenarians well supported, may read Bishop Newton on the prophecies, where this subject is handled at large. And if the text of St. Paul beforementioned, has any reference to a better state than this with regard to brutes, I should imagine that this must be the period, when it will take place.

of the other world were to be purely of a spiritual nature, and consequently that brutes were utterly incapable of partaking of them.

Various have been the opinions of philosophers concerning the substance of the human soul. The Epicureans thought it a subtle air, composed of fine atoms or primitive corpuscles. The Stoics, on the contrary, maintained that it was a flame or heavenly light. And the Cartesians make thinking the essence of the soul. Others again, hold that man is endowed with three kinds of soul, viz. the rational, which is a purely spiritual principle, created to live for ever, and infused by the immediate inspiration of God; the irrational or sensitive, which being common to man and brutes, is supposed to be formed of the elements; and lastly the vegetative soul, which is the principle of growth and nutrition, as the first is of understanding, and the second of animal life.

Let us now see what light we can gather from scripture, with regard to this. The
Rev.

Rev. Mr. Hallat, in his notes upon some peculiar texts of scripture, and in his discourse on 1 Cor. 2. 11. observes, that we continually talk of two parts of man, whereas St. Paul always mention three, viz. a *body*, a *soul*, and a *spirit*. Thus he says, 1 Theff. 5. 23. I pray God your whole spirit and soul and body may be preserved blameless, &c. This philosophy was antienter than St. Paul, and continued to be the doctrine of learned men after him also.

According to this notion, man is supposed to have two souls, the sensitive and the rational. The soul to which the five senses belong, and constitutes the man a mere animal, is by the author of the Apostolical Constitutions, book 7. ch. 34. called *the soul*. The other, which is called *the mind* or *the spirit*, is that which is endowed with reason and understanding, whereby man is distinguished from, and exalted above the brute creature.

We are next to consider what difference St. Paul supposed there was between the
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soul and the spirit. And upon examination it will be found, that he reckoned them to be so distinct, as that it is possible for the one of them to be separated from the other. He expressly speaks of their being separated, Heb. 4. 12. The word of God is quick and powerful, and sharper than a two edged sword, piercing even to the *dividing asunder of soul and spirit*, that is, to the dividing or separating the soul and spirit of a man from one another.

The late Dr. Brown, Bishop of Cork and Ross, in his discourse upon Gal. 5. 17. *For the flesh lusteth against the spirit*, &c. proves very clearly, that man is a compound of body, soul, and spirit.

By the *flesh*, says he, is here meant not only those bodily appetites, which are common to us with brutes, but likewise those irregular passions and affections of the soul, which are proper only to rational creatures. By the *spirit* is signified that most refined and excellent part of us, by which we are more immediately formed after the image
of

of God : That which the Hebrews expressed by the word *Ruah*, that immaterial, immortal part of us, which is the seat of the pure understanding and will ; in opposition to *Napash*, the seat of all carnal desires and affections, that is, the sensitive soul, as it includes all those evil inclinations of the mind, which proceed from any compliance with sensual appetites, and as far as it is tainted by any intercourse or commerce with them.

But because it is a distinction of no small use both in the theory and practice of religion, that we may apprehend the difference more exactly, we must consider, that it is an opinion founded on very good reason, that our frame is composed of three distinct parts, each of them severally expressed by St. Paul in 1 Thess. 5. 20. And I pray God, your whole *spirit*, and *soul*, and *body* be preserved blameless to the coming of our Lord Jesus Christ. The Greek word is plainer to this purpose ; it calls these three parts, *oloklerou umon*, the whole of you.

It is not likely that St. Paul here would have made use of a frivolous and groundless distinction with so much solemnity: and a learned man in his comment upon the text, remarks that the same difference might be observed from the words of the creation of man, where there is mention made distinctly of *the dust of the earth, the living soul, and the breath of life*; and shews withal how this text of St. Paul's was so taken by the most learned of the fathers of the church; which is not at all to be wondered at, since I cannot see how it can be understood any otherwise, without a needless tautology.

By this it appears that brutes have souls, in Latin, *animas*, *i. e.* they have a vegetative, sensitive, living principle lodged in them, which we term soul. But we should be unwilling to allow them the *animus quoque*, or (as Horace calls it) divine particular, that is, the rational, spiritual and immortal soul; this being the sole prerogative of man.

PROPOSITION V.

The notion that God annihilates the souls of brutes, is founded on weak arguments, and opposes arguments much clearer and stronger for the continuation of them.

A brute (says Mr. Addison) arrives at a point of perfection, that he can never pass: in a few years he has all the endowments he is capable of; and were he to live ten thousand more would be the same thing he is at present. Were a human soul thus at a stand in her accomplishments, were her faculties to be full blown, and incapable of farther enlargements, I could imagine it might fall away insensibly, and drop at once into a state of annihilation.

One argument to prove that the souls of brutes are annihilated when they die, is that they are incapable of religion. But you are of opinion that we meet with some of them, that discover something like a notion of it in particular instances. For that some of them will sooner be hanged than pilfer or

steal

steal—that they are true to their attachments, &c. and that it has been averred in print, that a certain dumb creature aided in the chorus of an anthem. A certain dumb creature aided in the chorus of an anthem! Why, that's impossible. Suppose Mrs. pufs, passing by and charmed with the music, did for a few moments stop and listen to it, was that aiding in the chorus? No, Mr. Dean, I am sure you know better.

As to your remarking that numbers of brutes, (I presume you mean dogs only) make as great a point of attending at church on public service days, as the most rigid pietists do; it is to be supposed that it is only at such churches, where the dogwipper does not duly execute his office.

But not to be behindhand with you even in story-telling, I do assure you, that it has likewise been averred in print concerning a certain grave dog, who most regularly attended divine service in the established church for several years, 'till after having been accidentally present at the holding-
forth

forth of an itinerant field-preacher, he suddenly became a schismatic, instantly forsook his parish church, and has ever since been as constant a frequenter of the tabernacle.

The next particular I shall take notice of under this proposition, is of a more serious nature. Certain it is, you say, that a future life of brutes cannot be absolutely denied, without impeaching the attributes of God. How so, Mr. Dean? For unless you can make it appear, (which you never can) that they are losers upon the whole, that is, that their sufferings have been an overbalance to their enjoyments, I say, it is a very bold and presumptuous assertion. But provided this was the case with them, shall the thing formed say unto him that formed it, Why hast thou made me thus? Hath not the potter power over the clay, of the same lump to make one vessel to honour, and another to dishonour! God will assuredly justify his ways to man, and be clear when he is judged, whether brutes are to have a being in future, or they are not. Know and study thyself, O man, and leave the decrees of the Almighty

Almighty to his own infinite wisdom and justice. Assert and live up to the dignity of thy nature ; and be assured, that at present thou art little inferior to the angels, and if thou art not grossly and supinely negligent and wanting to thyself, thou wilt hereafter be equal to those blessed spirits in heaven. Let us not pretend to be wise above what we are able, nor dive into things, which nothing concern us. *Quodenim supra nos, nihil ad nos.* Let us hear Mr. Wollaston's sentiments upon this matter.

“ Fancy a man walking, says he, in some retired field, far from noise, and free from prejudice, to debate this matter with himself, and then judge, whether such meditations as these would not be just. I think I may be sure, that neither lifeless matter, nor the vegetative tribe, that stone, that flower, that tree, have any reflex thoughts : nor do the sensitive animals, that sheep, that ox, seem to have any such thing, or but in the lowest degree, and in respect of present objects only. They do not reason or discourse. I may certainly, therefore, pretend to be
much

much above all these things ; and whether I shall live in some other state or not, I am certainly a *being* capable of such an expectation, and cannot but be solicitous about it, none of which can be said of these *clods*, or those *brutes*. Can I then be designed for nothing further, than just to eat, drink, sleep, walk about and act upon this earth, that is, to have no further being, than what these brutes have so far beneath me ? Can I be capable of such great expectations, which these animals know nothing of, (happier by far in this regard than I am, if we must die alike) only to be disappointed at last ? Thus placed, just upon the confines of another world, and fed with hopes of penetrating into it and enjoying it, only to make a short appearance here, and then to be shut out and totally sunk ? Must I then, when I bid farewell to these walks, when I close these lids, and yonder blue regions and all this scene darken upon me and go out, must I then only serve to furnish dust to be mingled with the ashes of these herds and plants, or with this dirt under my feet ?

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Have I been set so far above them in life, only to be levelled with them at death?"

If the souls of men are mortal, (extinguished at death) *the case of brutes is much preferable to that of men.* The pleasures of brutes, tho' but sensual, are more sincere, being palled or diminished by no diverting consideration. They go wholly into them, and when they have them not, they seem less to want them, not thinking of them. Their sufferings are attended with no reflection upon past or future causes, circumstances, &c. They are void of cares; are under no apprehension for families or posterity; never fatigue themselves with vain enquiries, hunting after knowledge, which must perish with them; are not anxious about a future state, nor can be disappointed of any hopes or expectations; and at last some sudden blow (or a few moments of unforeseen pain) finishes them, having never so much as known that they were mortal.

The second argument, you tell us, advanced against the future life of brutes, is
that

that they seem created chiefly to minister to man's pleasure and convenience. And I think a very good and sufficient reason too. Was not man constituted lord of this lower world? Was not all the *apparatus* and grandeur we see so admirably displayed in the frame of the universe, intended for his delight and service, as well as to excite his wonder and gratitude? Why should we then make the least doubt of it, but that brute creatures were in like manner formed for the use and benefit of man?

Should any one ask, why some of them are endowed with so much sagacity, sense and understanding, if they are to be annihilated at death? I answer, not only to shew forth the divine wisdom, power and goodness, but also to render them more serviceable to man. In short, every species of created beings is peculiarly constituted and adapted to fill up that particular department in the universal system, to which it is allotted by the all-wise Author of nature.

PROPOSITION VI.

The objections drawn from the scriptures against the futurity of brutes, are no real objections, but mistaken notions of the signification of terms and passages.

That remark of David in the Psalms, "Man abideth not in honour, seeing he may be compared to the brutes that perish," I shall pass over, and proceed to the passage in Ecclesiastes, where this question is propounded, "Who knoweth the spirit of a man, that goeth upward, and the spirit of a beast, that goeth downward to the earth?" This, you will have it, should be thus rendered, "Who knoweth concerning the spirit of a man, whether it goeth upward, or touching the spirit of a beast, whether it goeth downward to the earth?"

Truly, methinks, you've made Solomon make a very wise query. I would much sooner trust to Bishop Patrick's judgment, who thus paraphrases it. As for the spirit, which makes all the difference be-

tween

tween beasts and us, that is invisible : And where shall we find a man, especially among those great persons (spoken of before) who seriously considers it, and believes that the souls of all mankind go to God that gave them, (12. 7.) to be judged by him, (v. 17 of this chap.) whereas the souls of beasts, perish with them ? No ; they differ not at all from beasts, that having buried their minds in brutish pleasures, they have no more sense of a future life than they ; but imagine that their souls die together with their bodies.

If Solomon was of your way of thinking, he surely expressed himself very unintelligibly. For to say that the spirit of a man goeth upwards to God that gave it, and the spirit of a beast goeth downwards to the earth, is an odd way of representing the future life of brutes.

You further say, that Solomon never designed to teach us that the souls of brutes, after death, were totally to be cancelled, is evident from what he had before declared,
viz.

viz. " I know that whatsoever God doeth, it shall be forever ; nothing can be added to it and taken from it, and God doeth it that men should fear before him." This, in your opinion, is expressly asserting the eternity of all God's works. Now, I do not think it is. I rather take the expression, " it shall be for ever, &c." to signify, that whatsoever God doeth, it shall not be altered, or it cannot be better done. Besides the scripture assures to the contrary of what you assert. For a day will come, when the heavens shall pass away with a great noise, and the element shall melt with fervent heat; the earth also, and the works that are therein shall be burnt up.

There's a passage in St. Peter's general epistle, you have taken no notice of, tho' seemingly strong against you. " But these as natural brute beasts, made to be taken and destroyed, speak evil of the things that they understand not, and shall utterly perish in their own corruption."

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PROPOSITION VII.

The objections against the futurity of brutes, besides those we have already remarked, considered as human sentiments, are not founded in reason, but in pride and envy, and false notions of things.

As to those who object against the future existence of brutes, merely on account of their being inferior to man, we know them not. No; 'tis reason, well grounded reason, founded upon the eternal basis of scripture and truth, (as we have shewn above) and not pride, &c. that intimates to us, that the souls of brutes are not immortal.

Mr. Burgh, in his dignity of human nature, treating upon the immortality of the human soul, observes, that some have thought, that part of the arguments for the immortality of the human soul, being applicable to inferior natures, might be said to prove too much, and therefore to prove nothing. For the unequal allotment of happiness and misery among brute creatures seems to require that those, who have suffered

ferred unjustly in this state, should have such sufferings compensated to them in some future existence.

This difficulty is easily got over, if we consider, first, that the sufferings of the inferior creation are, so to speak, only momentary; whereas foreboding fears, and bitter reflections, encrease human miseries a thousand fold; which greatly abates the necessity of a future existence to make up for what they may have suffered here. Besides, justice does not require, that any species of creatures be wholly exempted from suffering; but only, that upon the whole, all creatures have it in their power to be gainers by their existence, that is, that they have in their power a greater share of happiness than misery.

You wind up the last proposition with these words. We do not presume to say, that these arguments demonstrate the point, but we cannot help flattering ourselves with the notion that they render it extremely probable.—So far are they from this, Mr. Dean, that they are but, in my opinion, the mere shadows

shadows of arguments : they carry neither conviction nor probability along with them.

However in the application you make to the reader, I heartily join issue with you. (t) Undoubtedly humanity and compassion ought to be used to brute creatures. As they have the same feelings with us, the bruises and wounds they receive, must be painful and afflictive to them. Whoever tortures a beast wantonly and without occasion, is a scandal to his species, and ought to be banished out of human society.

England, says a late ingenious writer, is the best country in the world for women, and the worst for horses. The kissing of a dog, and the driving a horse, without urgent necessity, 'till he drops down dead, seems equally absurd ; only the last is highly offensive to humanity. What pity is it,

(t) Solomon says, A righteous man regardeth the life of his beast ; but I think neither Solomon, nor any other preacher ever exhorted men to shew compassion to brutes, because they were to live in a future state, nor by any other motive that could signify, that their souls were immortal.

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that the most noble, generous, and beautiful creature of the brute creation should be ill-treated and pressed unnaturally beyond its strength ; and that this amusement should furnish occasions for rank villainy ? Cock-fighting too is a diversion much beneath the dignity of a gentleman, or indeed of any man. Besides I cannot conceive what pleasure there can be in seeing two innocent fowls tear each other to pieces. If there be any, it must be a very savage and barbarous pleasure.

You observe, in the last place, that since from the nature and exigencies of the times, it is expedient that many brutes should be killed, their lives ought to be taken from them in the easiest and shortest manner possible. And I add from Mr. Wollaston, that what is chiefly to be taken care of in this matter, is that the brute be not killed unnecessarily, and that no young be left to languish.

In your *addenda* you give us two texts more out of scripture, to corroborate and strengthen

strengthen your argument. The first is out of the acts of the apostles. " And God shall send Jesus Christ, which before was preached to you, whom the heavens must receive, until the times of restitution of all things." The apostle probably apprehended that the conversion of the Jews, as a people, would be attended with some extraordinary scene of prosperity and joy, and open a speedy way for Christ's descent from heaven, and the restitution of all things.

The other text is out of the second epistle of St. Peter, " For according to his promise we look for new heavens, and a new earth:" *i. e.* the whole frame of heaven and earth shall be wonderfully changed, and a new world made, when Christ comes to judgment.

Towards the conclusion of your essay, you propose the following queries. Must there not be a huge chasm and a vast defect in the universe, if all nature is to be radically destroyed below man; Must there not be

wanting on this hypothesis, myriads of creatures to testify the excellence of the divinity?

With respect to the former query, my opinion is, (as I have elsewhere hinted) that since the enjoyments of a future state are to be purely of a spiritual nature, and as brutes, by their very constitution, are incapable of partaking of such enjoyments; there will no real chasm, (*u*) no defect in the universe, tho' all nature below man should be extinguished. For as brute creatures were principally, if not solely formed for the delight

(*u*) You talk about a chain of things, and of a huge chasm and defect, if all nature below man is to be destroyed. Now, I should imagine the chain would be more uniform and gradual, to suppose that first there are things inanimate; then living creatures, whose soul lives in and by the body; and lastly, other beings, whose soul can and shall live for ever. Here the chain is regular; all is full, and no void or chasm. But according to your argument, God never gave life to any creature, but what is to endure for ever; and that I think makes a very great chasm. Pray, where was the chasm before the creation? Poor man! He fears that the power and glory of the Almighty will be lost in the top of his works, if they are not to be found at the bottom. Trust God. It will be remembered, that God can and had made creatures with mortal souls, when
and

and service of man, during his transitory abode upon earth; so at the final consummation of all things, as they will then have fully accomplished the end for which they were created, we may reasonably and safely conclude they will be reduced to a state of annihilation and non-existence.

And as to the latter query, we may rest fully assured, that God will have witnesses enow to testify the excellence of his divinity, whether brute creatures are to enjoy a portion of that eternal inheritance, which is prepared for those (and only those) that love and fear him, or they are not. At present there are myriads of spiritual beings surrounding the throne of the Almighty in humble adoration, and joining in rapturous hymns of praise to his divine majesty: and

some may wish they had never published an argument to the contrary. Not that I am in the least apprehensive of any mischief your book will do among the thinking and sensible part of mankind. However, what effects it may have upon ignorant and inconsiderate people, cannot so easily be ascertained. And I think it is St. Paul, who cautions us not to lay a stumbling block, or an occasion to fall, in our brother's way.

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at the general resurrection, there will be an inconceivable addition made to this triumphant band, of millions of glorified spirits, to assist in this grand seraphic chorus, whereby his great and glorious name will be abundantly extolled and magnified, without the unnecessary train of the lower orders of beings.—That you and all mankind may attain to this glorious, immortal and happy state, is the prayer of, Rev. Sir,

Your sincere friend,

7 JU 66 James Rothwell.

Blackrod,
March 27th, 1769.

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 Stanley, ditto
 Smith, ditto
 Sephton, Attorney, ditto
 Serjeant, Writing-master, ditto
 James Smalley, Blackrod
 James Scolcroft, ditto
 Henry Spencer, Dealer and Chapman,
 Oswaldtwistle
 Robert Shaw, Dealer and Chapman, Wigan
 John Smith, Grocer, Manchester
 John Smith, Hough-hall
 Robert Smith, Bolton
 Adam Smith, ditto
 Thomas Smith, Coppul
 Hugh Sim, Chorley
 Charles Shaw, Rivington
 George Sharrock, Chandler, Liverpool
 John Sharrock, Balderston
 Thomas Sumner, Aspul
 John Sundiford, Horwich
 James Southern, Westhoughton
 William Seddon, Lostock
 Thomas Stirrup, Bedford

T

Rev. Mr. Tatlock, West Derby
 ——— Tournough, Brindle
 Ralph Thicknesse, Doctor of Physic, Wigan
 Mr. Threlfall, Westhoughton
 Edward Taylor, hardwareman, Blackburn
 Matthew Taylor, Standish
 John Taylor, Chorley
 James Townshend, Blackrod
 George Tyror, ditto

U

Mr. Unsworth, Wigan

V

Mr. John Vause, Surgeon, Wigan
 Harry Vause, Bolton
 Ralph Vause, Horwich

W.

Rev. Mr. Withnel, Vicar of Dean

Wilson, Heapey

John Woodcock, Esq; Newborough

Mr. John Wilson, Merchant, Manchester

Wagner, Merchant, Liverpool

John Wilson, ditto

Richard Wadefon, ditto

Whittle, School-master, ditto

Mrs. Wright, Bolton

Mr. William Wesley, Chorley

John Walker, Street

John Walker, Shawplace

John Ward, Scoles

Samuel Ward, Blackrod

William Willding, ditto

Ralph Wright, ditto

Walmesley, Mercer, Wigan

Joseph Withington, Atherton

Worthington, ditto

James Wood, Aspul

Peter Woodcock, Leyland

John Wallworth, ditto

Robert Wilson, Hoole

John Worthington, ditto

John Wallwork, Worsley

James Whitaker, Oswaldtwistle

Christopher Whittle, Bolton

John Walker, Dealer and Chapman,
Ormskirk

John Wilcock, Brindle

John Waln, Adlington

William Wright, ditto

Ralph Winyard, Lostock

John Wales, Brinsford-hall

John Wigans, Salford

John Watmough, Hindley

Y

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Mr. John Yates, Farnworth hall

William Yates, Tanner, Kersley

Henry Yates, Plumber, Bolton

